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1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate whether the expanded re
quirements of SAS No. 59 (A/CPA [1988]), which requires auditors to
actively evaluate and report on a client's going-concern status for the
coming year, have allowed investors to make more accurate ex ante as
sessments of firms that eventually file for bankruptcy. We extend Chen
and Church [1996] (hereafter CC), who conclude that SAS No. 34 (A/CPA
[1981]) "subject to" going-concern opinions have information value be
cause they reduce the surprise associated with bankruptcy announce
ments. We hypothesize that if SAS No. 59 has achieved what was intended,
going-concern opinions issued under SAS No. 59 should further reduce
investor surprise at bankruptcy announcements. While we do not believe
SAS No. 59 was issued for the specific purpose of helping users to predict
bankruptcy, we do suggest that the increased auditor responsibility and
improved communication should provide users with information that is
of relatively higher quality. This argument is based on a number of im
portant differences between SAS No. 34 and SAS No. 59.
Under SAS No. 34, the auditor's responsibility to evaluate a firm's abil
ity to continue as a going concern was passive. Although auditors were
*Texas A&M University. We are grateful to an anonymous referee, Neil Fargher, Gary
Braun, Merle Erickson, James Flagg. Gary Giroux, Audrey Gramling, David Kerr, Mark
Taylor, and workshop participants at Texas A&M University for many helpful comments
and suggestions.
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not expected to ignore information relevant to the firm's going-concern
status, SAS No. 34 states that auditors need not search for this informa
tion because "in the absence of information to the contrary. an entity's
continuation is usually assumed in financial accounting" (AU §340, SAS
No. 34). SAS No. 34 also offers no specific guidelines regarding the time
period to be evaluated in going-concern investigations. In contrast, SAS
No. 59 states that the auditor "must evaluate whether there is substantial
doubt about the entity's ability to continue as a going concern for a rea
sonable period of time, not to exceed one year beyond the date of the
audited financial statements" (AU §341, SAS No. 59). Although SAS No. 59
notes that the auditor is not reguired to design audit procedures solely
for the purpose of evaluating the going-concern assumption. it does
state that the assumption itself must explicitly be evaluated in each au
dit. Also, under SAS No. 34, "substantial doubt" about a firm's continued
existence resulted in a modified report only if material uncertainties
existed regarding the recoverability and classification of assets and lia
bilities. In contrast, SAS No. 59 makes substantial doubt about a firm's
continued existence, by itself, the "triggering point" for report modifica
tion (Carmichael and Pany [1993]). To the extent that increased auditor
responsibilities and the improved communication of those responsibili
ties provide better information regarding future firm viability. we predict
that investors should be less surprised when bankruptcy filings follow
going-concern opinions issued under SAS No. 59.
Our results show that price responses to bankruptcy announcements
are, as predicted, less negative for firms receiving SAS No. 59 going
concern opinions than for firms receiving SAS No. 59 clean opinions,
and are less negative for firms receiving SAS No. 59 going-concern opin
ions than for firms receiving SAS No. 34 "subject to" going-concern
opinions. We also show that the difference between the going-concern
bankruptcy surprise and the clean opinion bankruptcy surprise under
SAS No. 59 is greater than the corresponding difference under SAS No.
34.1 Our results, which hold after controlling for macroeconomic condi
tions, firm-specific levels of financial distress, and the predictability of
certain types of bankruptcy filings. suggest that investors have benefited
from the implementation of SAS No. 59.
Section 2 presents our sample selection procedure and summary sta
tistics. In sections 3 and 4 we present our hypotheses and empirical re
sults and in section 5 we provide concluding remarks.

1 Due to the similarities involving go ing-concern evaluations under SAS No. 34 and its
predecessor, SA.S No. 2 [ 1974]. we categorize all pre-SAS No. 59 audit opinions as SAS No.
34 audit opinions. When we eliminate the 28 filings occurring prior to SAS No. 34 our in
ferences with respect to the incremental value of SAS No. 59 are unchanged.
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2. Sample Characteristics
The initial sample consisted of 251 firms identified by NAARS or the
Wall Street journal as having filed for bankruptcy between 1975 and 1996.
Like CC, we define the bankruptcy filing date as the day preceding the
Wall Streetjournal's disclosure that the bankruptcy filing has occurred, or
the date when the Wall Streetjournal states the filing is imminent. Of the
original sample of 251 firms, 217 had audit reports available and had
sufficient CRSP and Compustat data for the empirical tests. 2 Similar to CC,
we find that 41% of the 109 firms filing for bankruptcy prior to the adop
tion of SAS No. 59 received going-concern opinions. In contrast, 57% of
the 108 firms filing for bankruptcy after the adoption of SAS No. 59 re
ceived going-concern opinions. 3 These results, which are consistent with
the findings of Raghunandan and Ram a [1995], suggest that auditors
have made more accurate ex ante assessments of financially distressed
firms under the expanded requirements of SAS No. 59.
Summary statistics for the sample of 217 firms, presented in table 1,
show that firms receiving going-concern opinions are more highly lever
aged and Jess profitable than firms receiving clean opinions. To draw
inferences regarding bankruptcy probabilities, we use the revised Altman
[1983] Z-score model. This model predicts bankruptcy for firms with
scores less than 1.20 and suggests a "gray area" for scores between 1.20
and 2.90. The mean Z-score of -0.06 for the 107 going-concern firms is
significantly lower than the mean of 1.51 for the 110 clean opinion
firms, suggesting that going-concern opinions are more likely to be is
sued to firms in severe financial distress (see also McKeown, Mutchler,
and Hopwood [1991] ). This result obtains both across the entire sample
and within the SAS No. 34 and SAS No. 59 partitions. It is consistent with
previous research (e.g., Mutchler [1985] and Hopwood, McKeown, and
Mutchler [1989; 1994]) which shows that going-concern opinions can
often be predicted through ratio analysis and can themselves be useful in
predicting bankruptcy.

3. Hypotheses and Univariate Tests
Our empirical tests, which compare share price responses (i.e., inves
tor responses to bankruptcy news) both within and across time periods,
are based on the following four hypotheses:

2 Financial and audit opinion data were taken from the set of annual financial state
ments corresponding to the nearest fiscal year-end prior to the bankruptcy filing date.
3 The difference in proportions is significant at the 1% level. When we eliminate the
SAS No. 59 "transition period," as suggested by Carcello, Hermanson, and Huss [1997), our
findings do not change.
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TABLE 1
Mean Values of Selected Summary Measuresfor 217Firms Filingfor

Bankruptcy between 1975 and 1996
Partition

Total

De b t-to-

Return on

N

Assets

Assets

Assets

Z-Score

107
110

423.73
886.03

-0.06
1.51

Complete Sample

All Going-Concern Firms
All Clean Opinion Firms
p-Value for Difference

(0.20)

0.98

-0.33

0.71
(0.01)

-0.10
(0.01)

0.88
0.70

-0.26
-0.09
(0.01)

(0.01)

SAS No. 34 Firms

Going-Concern Firms
Clean Opinion Firms

45
64

p-Value for Difference

578.53
968.52
(0.58)

(0.01)

0.69
1.54
(0.06)

SAS No. 59 Firms

Going -Co ncern Firms
Clean Opinion Firms
p-Va lue for Difference
Going-Concern Firms
SAS No. 34 CC Firms
SAS No. 59 CC Firms
p-Value for Difference
Clean Opinion Firms
SAS No. 34 Clean Firms
SAS No. 59 Clean Firms

p-Value for Difference

62
46

313.88

45
62

578.53
313.88
(0.30)

64
46

968.52
768.70
(0.74)

768.70
(0.08)

1.06
0.73
(0.01)

-0.38
-0.12
(0.01)

-0.61
1.46
(0.01)

0.88
1.06
(0.05)

-0.26
-0.38
(0.20)

-0.61
(0.02)

0.70
0.73
(0.45)

-0.09
-0.12
(0.49)

1.54
1.46
(0.83)

0.69

Rank-sum tests for median differences yield directly comparable results. Debt·to·assets is defined as
total liabilities/total assets. Return on assets is defined as net income/total assets. Z.score is calculated
using the method of Altman (1983]. All values are taken from the last set of financial statements preceding the bankruptcy filing.

HI:

Bankruptcy surprises are smaller for firms receiving SAS No. 34
going-concern opinions than for firms receiving SAS No. 34 clean
opinions.

H2: Bankruptcy surprises are smaller for firms receiving SAS No. 59
going-concern opinions than for firms receiving SAS No. 59 clean
opinions.
H3: The difference between the going-concern and clean opinion
bankruptcy surprise is larger under SAS No. 59 than it was under
SAS No. 34.
H4: Bankruptcy surprises are smaller for firms receiving SAS No. 59

going-concern opinions than for firms receiving SAS No. 34 going
concern opinions.

HI is a replication of CC, who show that share prices of firms receiv
ing "subject to" going-concern qualifications respond less negatively to
bankruptcy announcements than prices of firms receiving SAS No. 34
clean opinions. H2 extends the CC findings into the post-1989 period
by comparing price responses associated with SAS No. 59 going-concern
opinions to price responses associated with SAS No. 59 clean opinions.
H3 and H4 examine whether SAS No. 59 has allowed investors to make
more accurate assessments of firms that are financially distressed. H3
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examines the degree to which bankruptcy surprises in general are miti
gated under SAS No. 59 relative to SAS No. 34. In other words, in H3 we
suggest that if users are able to make better ex ante judgments under SAS
No. 59, the difference between the going-concern price response and the
clean opinion price response under SAS No. 59 should be greater than
the corresponding difference under SAS No. 34. With H4, we propose
that bankruptcy surprises associated with SAS No. 59 going-concern opin
ions should be smaller than bankruptcy surprises associated with SAS
No. 34 going-concern opinions. That is, given a going-concern opinion,
the price response to a bankruptcy filing announcement should be less
negative under SAS No. 59 than it was under SAS No. 34.4
We define the announcement-period excess return as the difference
between the sample firm's return and the return for the sample firm's
CRSP size decile portfolio from day -1 to day + 1, relative to the bank
ruptcy filing announcement.5 Across the complete sample of firms the
mean excess return for firms receiving going-concern opinions is -23%,
significantly smaller (p < 0.01) than the mean excess return of -33% for
firms receiving clean opinions. Therefore, consistent with CC, going
concern opinions in general do appear to reduce the surprise associated
with bankruptcy filings. Our univariate analysis also suggests that the sur
prise is reduced more under SAS No. 59 than it was under SAS No. 34.
Specifically, the mean excess return for SAS No. 59 going-concern firms
of -19% is smaller (p < 0.01) than the mean excess return of -35% for
SAS No. 59 clean opinion firms and is also smaller (p
0.04) than the
mean response of -28% for SAS No. 34 going-concern firms. However, we
detect no statistically significant difference (p
0.30) between going
concern and clean opinion price responses (-28% and -33%, respec
tively) under SAS No. 34. Our univariate findings support H2, H3, and
H4 but not HI.
=

=

4. Multivariate Tests
4.1 MODEL DEVELOPMENT
To investigate the relation between bankruptcy surprises and audit
opinions in a multivariate setting, we estimate the following model:
ERi

=

+ y5RUNUP

j

+

+

y2GCi + y3cci x SAS59j + y4BKPROBi
y6PREDIC'0 + y7CP� + YaGDPj + fi

Yo+ y1SAS59i

(1)

In equation (1), ER is the firm's three-day decile-adjusted excess re
turn, SAS59 is an indicator variable equal to 1 (0) for firms announcing
bankruptcy filings under SAS No. 59 (SAS No. 34), and GC is an indica
tor variable equal to 1 (0) for firms receiving a going-concern (clean)
4lf bankruptcy surprises are identical for firms receiving clean opinions under SAS
H3 and H4 are equivalent.
5 Risk-adjusted excess returns based on value- and equal-weighted market indices yield
directly comparable results.

No. 59 and SAS No. 34,
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audit opinion in either period. These two indicator variables in combi
nation with the interaction term are used to test Hypotheses 1-4.
The remaining variables are control measures. Mutchler [1985] shows
that going-concern opinions often can be predicted through ratio anal
ysis. To control for the possibility that the reduced bankruptcy surprise is
attributable to financial measures rather than the going-concern opin
ion, we incorporate a ratio-based measure of financial distress (BKPROB),
defined as Altman's [1983] Z-score multiplied by -1 and calculated as of
the last financial statement date prior to the bankruptcy filing.6 We in
clude RUNUP to control for price changes occurring prior to the issu
ance of the audit report. RUNUP is equal to the firm's decile-adjusted
excess return calculated from day -240 to day -10, relative to the release
of the last 10-K preceding the bankruptcy filing.
In addition to BKPROB and RUNUP, we include PREDIC1; CPI, and GDP
to further control for factors that could influence the surprise associated
with bankruptcy filing announcements. With PREDICTwe model the re
duction in bankruptcy surprise that may be attributable to the predict
ability of certain types of filings or to the richness of the firm's informa
tion environment (in the spirit of McNichols and Manegold [1983]).
Specifically, PREDICTis an indicator variable taking the value of one if the
firm's bankruptcy is prepackaged or is due to union disputes or litigation,
or if the firm is in the top half of the CRSP market capitalization distri
bution during the bankruptcy announcement year.7 If investors are less
surprised by filings that are inherently more predictable or by filings made
by firms with greater media coverage, the coefficient for PREDICTshould
be positive.
With CPI and GDP we attempt to control for broad changes in the
macroeconomic environment occurring across our sample period.8 CPI
and GDP represent the percentage change in the Consumer Price Index
and Gross Domestic Product, respectively, for the year of the bankruptcy
filing.9 To the extent that higher rates of inflation or lower rates of eco
nomic growth are indicative of an unfavorable macroeconomic environ
ment, we expect investors to be less surprised by bankruptcy filings in
general when these conditions obtain. Therefore, we expect the coeffi
cient for CPI to be positive and the coefficient for GDP to be negative.
6We multiply the Z-score by -1 to simplify interpretation of the regression coefficient.
Higher values of BKPROB (i.e., the transformed Z-score) correspond to higher probabili
ties of bankruptcy.
i Prepackaged bankruptcies or bankruptcies resulting from union disputes or litigation
are more likely to be priced prior to the actual filing announcement. Furthermore, Mc
Connell, Lease, and Tashjian [1996) show that prepacks typically are less costly than other
types of bankruptcies. which likely would decrease the magnitude of the measured
response.
8 RUNUP should control for some of these effects as well, given that it is defined in
terms of deviations from market (i.e., decile-adjusted) returns.
9 Our results are unchanged when CPI and GDP are defined in terms of lagged percent
age changes.
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TABLE 2
Bankruptcy Sm·pri.se Model and Predictions for Going-Concern Opinion Effects
ER j =Yo+ y1SAS59j + y2 cc j + y3Gcj x SAS59j + y4BKPROBj

+ y5RUNUPj + y6PREDICT j+ y7CP� + Y-oGDPj + ej

Going-Concern Opinion Effect

Test

Predicted
Sign

Coefficient(s)

Before SAS No. 59,

how much
did GC opinions reduce the
surprise associated with bank
ruptcy filings?

HI

After SAS No. 59, how much have
GC opinions reduced the
surprise associated with bank
ruptcy filings?

H2

(Yn + Yt + Y2 + Yg) - (Yo+ Yt) = Y2 + Y3

What is the difference between
the bankruptcy surprise reduction under SAS No. 59 and the
bankruptcy surprise reduction
under SAS No. 34?

H3

[(yo+ Y1 + Y!! + Y:1l- (Yo+ YJ))

(Yo+ Y2l - (Yo)

=

Y2

- [(yo+ Y2l - (Yo)] = Y3

Given a GC opinion, what is the
difference between the SAS
H4
(Yo + Y! + Y2 + Y�) - (Yo + Y2l=Y 1 + Y3
No. 59 bankruptcy s urp rise and
the SAS No. 34 bankruptcy
surprise'
ER
cumul ative excess dc:C'ile-a<ljusted rettJrn f'rom <hL}' -1 to day +I rdativt: tO the ba nkrupt cy
=

ment date. SAS.59= I

+

+

+

+

announce

(0) if the firm li lcd for bankruptcy afte•· (befo,·e) SAS No. 59 was adopted. CC= I (0) if the

opinion . 81\PROB = Allman's I 1983) Z- scor e multiplied by -I.
from day -250 t o day -10 relaLive to the last financi al state 
ment fllin g date prior to bank rup tcy. PREDICT= I if h<u• k ruptc y is prepackaged or due to union disputes or lit
igation, or if firm is in the top hair of CRSP market n•pitalization distrihution: = 0 otherwise. CPI= %change in
the Consumer Price Index in tlH· bankruptcy filing y<·ar. GDP = % c h ange in the Gross Domestic Product in the
ban kruptc y filing year.
firm

received

a

going-concern (clean)

au dit

RUNUP= cumulative excess decile-adjusted retu rn

As previously mentioned, our primary test coefficients are y1, Y2· and
y3. These coefficients, taken individually and in subsets, are used to test
Hypotheses l-4. To illustrate more formally how the multivariate model
addresses our hypotheses, table 2 summarizes the tests we propose. Pos
itive estimates for Y2 and (y2 + y3) would support Hl and H2, respec
tively, while positive estimates for Y3 and (y1 + yg) would support H3
and H4.

4.2

EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Table 3 presents the results associated with OLS estimation of equation
(1). 10 Like CC, we find a significant (p 0.05) negati\'e relation between
=

10We remove nine observations having studentized residuals with absolute values
higher than 2.00. Alternative screens suggested by Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch [1980] pro
duce directly comparable results. If no outliers are removed, the model's adjusted R2 de
creases but the indh·idual coefficient estimates remain significant.

TABLE

N>
,_.
0>

3

Regression ofBankruptcy Surprises on SAS No. 34 and SAS No. 59 Audit Opinion Variables and
Selected Firm-Specific and Macroeconomic Controls

r
0

E� =Yo+ y1SAS59j + y2GCj + y3GCj x SAS59j + y4BKPROBj

�
?=

+ y5RUNUPj + y6PREDICTj + y7CPlj + y8GDPj + ej

Panel A: The Model
Coefficient Estimate
p-Value

Adjusted R2

Yo

Yl

Y2

Ys

Y4

Y5

Y6

Y7

Ya

-0.525
(0.01)
0.147

0.015
(0.39)

0.053
(0.13)

0.139
(0.02)

-0.011
(0.05)

-0.007
(0.42)

0.130
(0 .01)

0.029
(0 .01)

-0.003
(0.37)

Y2 + Y3

Y1 + Y3

0.192
(0.01)

0.154
(0.01)

�
til
til

Panel B: Joint Tests

Coefficient Estimate
p-Value

X
0
r
t:l
t!j

p-value s are one-tailed. ER =cumulative excess decile-adjusted return from day -I to day + 1 relative to the bankruptcy announcement
date. SAS59= 1 (0) if the firm filed for bankruptcy after (before) SAS No. .59 was adopt ed. GC = 1 (0) if the firm received a going-concern
(clean) audit opinion. BKPROB =Altman's [1983) Z-score multiplied by -1. RUNUP= cumulative excess decile-adjusted return from day -250
to day -10 relative to the last financial statement filing date prior to bankruptcy. PREDICT= I if bankruptcy is prepackaged or due to union
disputes or l itigatio n , or if firm is in the tOp half of CRSP marke t capitalization distribution; = 0 ot herwi se. CPI= % change in the Con
sumer Price Index in the bankruptcy filing year. GDP=% change in the Gross Domestic Product in the bankruptcy filing year.

�t:l
�

()

�
r
�

�

�z
(/)
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bankruptcy probability (BKPROB) and excess returns. Two of the three
additional control variables not modeled by CC are significant as well.
The positive estimate for PREDICT indicates that investors are less sur
prised by bankruptcy announcements that are more predictable. Simi
larly, the positive estimate for CPI and the negative, albeit insignificant,
estimate for GDP suggest that bankruptcy shocks are smaller when the
macroeconomic environment is relatively unfavorable.ll
The coefficients associated with SAS No. 34 and SAS No. 59 going
concern opinions support three of our four hypotheses.l2 In contrast to
CC, we do not find that SAS No. 34 going-concern opinions reduce, rela
tive to SAS No. 34 clean opinions, the surprise associated with bankruptcy
filings. Therefore, we do not find support for HI. When our macroeco
nomic controls are excluded from the model, however, the findings are
generally consistent with CC (the coefficient for GC is significant at p
0.07). We conjecture that a portion of the SAS No. 34 going-concern
effect documented by Chen and Church [1996] may be attributable to
correlated, omitted economic factors that we model more fully.
In contrast to the minimal SAS No. 34 effect, table 3 reveals that SAS
No. 59 going-concern opinions result in smaller bankruptcy surprises
than SAS No. 59 clean opinions. The significant (p < 0.01) estimate for
(Y2 + Y3) illustrates that SAS No. 59 going-concern opinions decrease the
bankruptcy surprise by 19.2 percentage points relative to SAS No. 59
clean opinions, supporting H2.
H3 and H4 compare share price effects under SAS No. 59 to share
price effects under SAS No. 34. H3 is tested with y3, which is positive and
0.02) in table 3. As is shown in table 2, a positive value
significant (p
for y3 indicates that the difference (i.e., the spread) between the going
concern bankruptcy surprise and the clean opinion bankruptcy surprise
under SAS No. 59 is greater than the corresponding difference under SAS
No. 34. More specifically, Y3 reveals that after controlling for BKPROB,
RUNUP, PREDICT, CPI, and GDP, the difference between the going-con
cern and clean opinion price response is 13.9 percentage points greater
under SAS No. 59 than it was under SAS No. 34. Similar conclusions can
be drawn from (y 1 + y3), which measures the difference between going
concern price responses under SAS No. 59 and going-concern price re
sponses under SAS No. 34. The significant (p 0.01) positive estimate for
(y1 + y3) reveals that given a going-concern opinion, bankruptcy shocks
=

=

=

11

Chen and Church [1996] document a significant negative relationship between
during the SAS No. 34 period. We find RUNUP to be negative and signifi
cant during the SAS No. 34 period as well; however, this effect does not persist across the
entire sample period.
12 W
e estimate additional models where the dependent variable is defined, alternatively,
as the excess return calculated from day -3 to day +I and from day 5 to day +I. These
models produce directly comparable results.

RUNUP and ER

-

218

LORI M. HOLDER-WEBB AND MICHAELS. WILKINS

are 15.4 percentage points smaller under the new standard. 1:� Thus, SAS
No. 59 does appear to have allowed investors to better assess companies
that are financially distressed.

6.

Conclusions

With the adoption of SAS No. 59, the Auditing Standards Board re
placed a passive responsibility with an active responsibility imposed on
auditors to assess the likelihood of a client's continued existence for one
year from the date of the financial statements. If the increased auditor
responsibilities have allowed users to make more accurate ex ante judg
ments regarding firms that ultimately file for bankruptcy, we should ob
serve smaller bankruptcy shocks for announcements that follow SAS No.
59 going-concern opinions than for announcements that follow SAS No.
34 going-concern opinions.
Our results indicate that bankruptcy surprises associated with SAS No.
59 going-concern opinions are significantly smaller than bankruptcy sur
prises associated with both SAS No. 59 clean opinions and SAS No. 34
going-concern opinions. and that the difference between the going
concern bankruptcy surprise and the clean opinion bankruptcy surprise
under SAS No. 59 is greater than the corresponding difference under
SAS No. 34. These results hold after controlling for the predictability of
the bankruptcy filing, the macroeconomic environment during the an
nouncement year, and firm-specific levels of financial distress.
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